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SUBJECT: READOUT FROM DECEMBER 4 IRAQ AND NEIGHBORS RSI IN AMMAN, JORDAN

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR Dell Dailey FOR REASONS 1.4 (b)  
and (d)

¶11. (S) Summary: U.S. Chiefs of Mission and embassy representatives from Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, joined by S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Dell Dailey and other U.S. interagency representatives, met December 4 in Amman to discuss regional counterterrorism strategies at an Iraq and Neighbors Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) conference (participants listed para 19). The meeting focused on the flow of foreign fighters (FF) into and out of Iraq. Significant outcomes and taskers from the meeting included:

- A needs assessment for S/CT counter-terrorism training of Iraqi Security Forces.
- Intelligence community review of the use of Cairo airport by foreign fighters.
- Review of releasability of Objective Massey data to Syria.
- Development of an easily accessible database of documents and videos of statements by Muslim clerics and leaders encouraging moderation and/or supportive of U.S. efforts.
- Development of material on "best practices" for promoting moderation and countering radicalization.
- Schedule SVTC for Amb. Dailey to brief on foreign fighters to the countries he will not be visiting.
- Schedule follow-up Biometric Conference in Spring 2008.
- Identify venue for next in-field RSI conference in late ¶2008.

End Summary.

¶12. (S) Ambassador David Hale Embassy Amman hosted an Iraq and Neighbors Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) conference on December 4 attended by Chiefs of Mission and other embassy representatives from Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey. They were joined by the S/CT Coordinator and other representatives of the interagency process. Amb. Dailey noted past successes in the RSI process, including Jordan's regional biometric database initiative, expansion of the TIP/PISCES program, establishment of S/CT regional counterterrorism coordinator positions, development of new regional IV programs, progress in critical energy infrastructure protection, and a financial needs assessment in northern

Iraq to combat the financing of the PKK and other terrorist groups. Amb. Dailey described the CT philosophy behind the RSI concept as a triangle, with the top 15 percent representing kinetic action (kill or capture), the middle 20 percent representing efforts to disrupt FF networks by hindering or eliminating their recruitment, travel, training and operation, and the bottom 65 percent representing efforts to address root social, ideological, political and economic causes behind violent extremism. While DOD, the CIA and law enforcement agencies have the lead in the top 40 percent, the State Department has the lead in the lower 60 percent, he stressed.

#### Leveraging OBJ Massey

¶3. (S) Participants were briefed on and discussed the importance of documents seized during a U.S. military operation raid on Abu Muthanna(OBJ Massey), the primary al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) leader responsible for facilitating the infiltration of foreign fighters from Syria into Iraq. Charge Corbin noted that the Syrian government knows AQI plans to target Syria, and that while FF facilitators continue to operate and questions remain about Syria's role, there is clear evidence of Syrian moves against extremists.

¶4. (S) Amb. Dailey pointed out that when areas of conflict quiet down, FF tend to return home to make trouble, and urged Posts to make it clear to host countries that FF bleed-out into their countries of origin creates a common threat. He reported that he had briefed leaders in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Yemen on OBJ Massey in November and plans to brief governments of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in February. NOTE: Briefings took place February 7-11. END NOTE. Amb. Dailey argued that the U.S. could have the biggest impact by sharing the names obtained during OBJ Massey with host countries and let them "run traps" for those FF listed. Most participants cited sharing this information with Syria as vital, but requiring policy decisions in Washington. NOTE: Subsequently, Embassy Damascus has been given the green light to brief the Syrians yet no date has been set. The OBJ Massey data on individual terrorists is already available to Syria through INTERPOL. END NOTE.

#### Deradicalization and Combating Extremism

¶5. (S) Participants turned to the question of confronting extremist ideology and how to redirect confirmed radicals and potential recruits from terrorism. Ambassador Ford Fraker briefed on Saudi efforts, which treat confronting extremism as a struggle to win hearts and minds, not solely as a police matter. Their key tactic is to deal with extremists and returnees from Iraq as victims, not criminals. Returnees from Guantanamo and Iraq, as well as those extremists that the SAG captures at home, are first evaluated by psychologists and religious officials. Second, the subject goes through a religious re-education program that uses Islamic sources to refute extremist ideology. Third, the SAG works with the subject's family and wider community to integrate him back into society, in part through financial incentives and health care services to the family and by providing employment to the subject and encouraging marriage. The SAG continues to monitor the rehabilitated individuals.

¶7. (S) Major General Michael Barbero of MNF-I noted that Iraq was deploying similar programs, using tribes and religious re-education to turn extremists toward moderation and away from AQI. Charge DAffaires Alan Misenheimer noted that Kuwait has a "Moderation Center" that uses a variation of the Saudi tactic, but stressed that the Saudi template would not work everywhere. The Kuwaitis, however, are not sharing the findings from their research on extremism in Kuwait. EmbAmman DCM briefed on GOJ efforts to win hearts and minds through the November 9, 2004 "Amman Message" ([www.ammanmessage.com](http://www.ammanmessage.com)). This message, issued by members of different schools of Islamic

jurisprudence whom King Abdallah II brought together, sought to delegitimize "takfir," the labeling of other Muslims as unbelievers worthy of targeting by extremists. It stressed Islam does not condone terrorism and Muslims must be loyal and law-abiding members of the states and societies in which they live.

#### What About U.S. Public Diplomacy?

¶ 8. (S) RSI participants discussed the applicability of Amman Message-type projects in other countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia, perhaps with U.S. help. Participants concluded that a U.S. role, particularly an overt one, in supporting moderates in the intra-Muslim dialogue is problematic, and would likely be counterproductive. The key to getting host-government buy-in on anti-extremism efforts is appealing to their desire for self preservation. Governments that recognize extremism is a direct threat are more likely to confront extremism and terrorists, and to take more significant steps against AQ and FF transit through their territories.

¶ 9. (S) The participants agreed on the utility of expending resources in two areas: 1) compiling a database of and access to significant statements by Muslim religious and other leaders on moderation as an Islamic tenet, including public source videos and documents, and 2) acquiring access to anti-extremist curricula from host governments that have successfully de-programmed extremists, with the aim of sharing these curricula with third party governments when appropriate.

#### Merits of Engaging with Damascus on FF

¶ 10. (S) The NSC representative briefed on IA efforts to stem FF flows through Damascus airport. The NSC has spearheaded an effort to provide unclassified briefings for aviation companies that serve Damascus to raise awareness and elicit information that could illuminate trends in foreign fighter travel.

¶ 11. (S) Returning to the subject of increased engagement with Damascus, participants weighed using a visit by General Petraeus or another high-level U.S. official to change Syrian behavior and direct attention to the FF issue. The group agreed that DC policymakers would need to be convinced that such a visit would be a net gain. Baghdad PolMil Minister-Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries observed the Iraqi government has gotten Damascus to listen to its FF concerns through engagement with counterparts in Syria. The possibility was raised of using the Damascus-hosted Iraq neighbors' working group on border security to address the FF issue and create a basis for information sharing. Several members of the group pointed out the presence of Iran in the working group would make it difficult for many Arab governments to share information through this mechanism.

#### Status of GOJ Regional Biometric Initiative

¶ 12. (S) Amb. Hale reported that, as proposed at the August RSI video conference, a team of technical experts from Washington had visited Jordan in October to evaluate the GOJ's progress toward developing a fingerprint-sharing database system for known and suspected terrorists. The visiting team determined that following the purchase of commercial software and two-to-three months of development, the GOJ could have a functioning system which could be demonstrated at a second Biometrics Conference. The GOJ currently envisions a database populated initially with fingerprints submitted by each member country. Member countries would be able to make their own independent queries and searches against that database. The GOJ may be in a position to host the second conference in late spring 2008. Amb. Hale pointed to this initiative as a good tangible outcome of the RSI process.

¶13. (S) Amb. Ries briefed on the visit of the Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC) to the Kurdistan region of Iraq in November. The ITFC was looking into the financing of the PKK and found that they raise money in Europe, Turkey, and the U.S. through criminal and legitimate means. Most of the money is moved through an informal financial system based on hawala-like money exchangers. An S/CT-led Financial Systems Assessment Team (FSAT) followed up the ITFC assessment during a December 8-14 visit to northern Iraq. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Swartz added that the Resident Legal Advisor in Ankara has been working on disrupting the financing of the PKK from Europe for the past year.

#### Critical Infrastructure Protection

¶14. (S) Amb. Fraker briefed on continuing U.S. efforts to work with the Government of Saudi Arabia to protect critical infrastructure. Since the December 2006 signing of an MOU between the Department of State and the SAG, a joint working group has met four times and several assessment teams have visited Saudi oil and gas facilities. Charge Misenheimer reported that in Kuwait an USG assessment has been conducted and a MOU drafted but the GOK has failed to identify an agency to sign the MOU.

#### Passenger Name Record (PNR)

¶15. (C) DHS Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Rosenzweig discussed the benefits of passenger name record (PNR) data analysis. Every passenger who travels via commercial air generates two sets of data: the passenger manifest (name, sex, country of origin, passport number, country of issuance) and commercial data (address, phone number(s), emergency contact information, traveling companions, travel agency, etc.). While manifest data is effective in identifying known threats, commercial data can identify new threats by linking people to those who have connections to known terrorists, he noted.

¶16. (S) All airlines that service the U.S. are required to provide DHS with both sets of data, which has allowed DHS to identify previously-unknown threats and travel agencies that specialize in crimes such as trafficking. DHS wants this information from flights that do not have a nexus to the U.S. but are known FF routes. DAS Rosenzweig recounted successes in the Caribbean under CARICOM. To implement an PNR arrangement, a country needs (1) laws requiring carriers to provide commercial and manifest data; (2) a way of transmitting the data to U.S.; and (3) the infrastructure to compile this data. DHS has already approached the Libyans, Yemenis and the Saudis. The Libyans were receptive and the Yemenis were also interested but lack the required infrastructure. The Saudis seek additional proof that it works. Amb. Fraker suggested that a six-month trial in Saudi might be the easiest way to convince the SAG of its value. Amb. Hale commented that Jordan would be very receptive, but would likely expect U.S. financial assistance to implement. Dailey encouraged all embassies to approach host governments and describe the benefits of a PNR sharing arrangement. DAS Rosenzweig agreed to send DHS teams to brief host countries as needed.

#### Other Initiatives

¶17. (C) Deputy Assistant AG Swartz reminded participants of additional ways that DOJ can support CT efforts. In addition to LEGATTs posted throughout the region, DOJ has posted several federal prosecutors in places like Cairo, Ankara, and the UAE to develop capacity-building programs to build networks and give ownership to host governments. Amb. Dailey discussed the value of DOD-sponsored MIST teams that have been highly effective in South America and Asia and announced upcoming Voluntary Visitor Programs (VVPs) focused on counterterrorism training. S/CT, in collaboration with R, hopes to design multi-country VVP

programs that encourage regional cooperation and use of open source materials. Dailey also reminded participants of the CT Fellowship Program which is designed for two-three star equivalents, parliamentarians, deputy ministers, etc. Interested embassies should follow-up with nominations through their Defense Attachs. Amb. Hale reminded participants of the need to amplify the message of these programs and encourage attendees to think creatively about how to broaden the effect when trainees return home. Others noted DOD's ability to develop websites and blogs to counter radical views.

¶18. (S) In wrapping up the session, Amb. Dailey identified the following issues to be addressed:

- A needs assessment for S/CT counter-terrorism training of Iraqi Security Forces. NOTE: DS/ATA is looking into Embassy Baghdads request and is putting together a list of courses to offer to the Government of Iraq. END NOTE.
- Intelligence community review of the use of Cairo airport by foreign fighters. NOTE: IC has been tasked with conducting the review. END NOTE.
- Review of releasability of Objective Massey data to Syria. NOTE: NSC approved release of OBJ Massey information by the Embassy Damascus. END NOTE.
- Development of an easily accessible database of documents and videos of statements by Muslim clerics and leaders encouraging moderation and/or supportive of U.S. efforts.
- Development of material on "best practices" for promoting moderation and countering radicalization.
- Schedule SVTC for Amb. Dailey to brief on foreign fighters to the countries he will not be visiting. NOTE: SVTC will be conducted the week of March 10. END NOTE.
- Schedule follow-up Biometric Conference in early 2008.
- Identify venue for next in-field RSI conference in late ¶2008.

¶19. (U) List of participants at the December 4 RSI conference in Amman, Jordan:

Amb. David Hale (Amman)  
Amb. Dell Dailey (S/CT Coordinator)  
Amb. Ford Fraker (Riyadh)  
PolMil Minister-Counselor Amb. Marcie Ries (Baghdad)  
CDA Michael Corbin (Damascus)  
CDA Alan Misenheimer (Kuwait)

Regional Affairs Counselors (Amman, Ankara, Kuwait, and Baghdad)  
Dallas Brown, Director, Joint Interagency Coordination Group (Centcom)  
Maj. Gen. David Scott (USSCOM)  
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of DHS Paul Rosenzweig  
Maj. Gen. Michael Barbero (DCS MNF-I C3)  
Brig. Gen. Michelle Johnson (DD/War on Terrorism/DOD)  
Mark Hunter (Assistant Director DS/T)  
Lynnnda Tibbets (Deputy Director DS/T/ATA)  
Matt Diascro (Director, Combating Terrorism, NSC)  
Garry Reid (Principal Director OSD SO/LIC)  
Lt. Col. Michael Foster (JIATF-West)  
Commander Christopher Engdahl (Strategic Planner/War on Terrorism/DOD)  
CIA Briefing  
Stephen Newhouse (DD NEA/ELA)  
Carol Reynolds (S/CT Regional Coordinator)  
Elizabeth Ingalls (S/CT)

Ambassador Dailey's Comment

¶20. (S) Much of the discussion at this RSI focused on bilateral issues, and most of the "due-outs" from the conference were bilateral and will not likely have a regional impact. To make the RSI process meaningful to Ambassadors, a more regionally-oriented counterterrorism focus is needed. Ongoing programs that accomplish this

are the biometrics conference and S/CT's funding for the participation of counterterrorism officials in the IVLP. S/CT will work on refocusing the RSI on having more of a multilateral CT angle. Amb. Dailey asks for Ambassadors' assistance in thinking more regionally and invites the field to recommend strategies and programs toward that end.

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